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Abstract
States, organizations and individuals are becoming targets of both individual and state-sponsored cyber-attacks, by those
who recognize the impact of disrupting security systems and effect to people and governments. Wide range of critical
infrastructure sectors are reliant on industrial control systems for monitoring processes and controlling physical devices and
for that reason, physical connected devices that support industrial processes are becoming more vulnerable. Not all critical
infrastructure operators in all sectors are adequately prepared to manage protection (and raise resilience) effectively across
both cyber and physical environments. Additionally there are few challenges in implementation of protection measures,
such as lack of collaboration between private and public sector and low levels of awareness on existence of national key
legislation.
From supranational aspect, in relation to this papers topic, the European Union has took first concrete step in defense to
cyber threats in 2016 with „Directive on security of network and information systems“ (NIS Directive) by prescribing
Member States to adopt more rigid cyber-security standards. The aim of directive is to improve the deterrent and increase
the EU’s defenses and reactions to cyber attacks by expanding the cyber security capacity, increasing collaboration at an EU
level and introducing measures to prevent risk and handle cyber incidents. Yet, not all Member States share the same
capacities for achieving the highest level of cyber-security. They need to continuously work on enhancing the capability of
defense against cyber threats as increased risk to state institutions information and communication systems but also the
critical infrastructure objects. In Southeast Europe there are few additional challenges – some countries even don't have
designated critical infrastructures and they are only perceived through physical prism; non-EU countries are not obligated to
follow requirements of European Union and its legislation, and there are interdependencies and transboundary cross-sector
effects that needs to be taken in consideration. Critical infrastructure Protection is the primary area of action, and for some
of SEE countries (like the Republic of Croatia) the implementation of cyber security provisions just complements
comprehensive activities which are focused on physical protection.
This paper will analyze few segments of how SEE countries cope with new security challenges and on which level are they
prepared for cyber-attacks and threats: 1. Which security mechanisms they use; 2. The existing legislation (Acts, Strategies,
Plan of Action, etc.) related to cyber threats in correlation with strategic critical infrastructure protection documents.
Analysis will have two perspectives: from EU member states and from non-EU member states point of view. The aim of
research is to have an overall picture of efforts in region regarding cyber-security as possibility for improvement thorough
cooperation, organizational measures, etc. providing also some recommendations to reduce the gap in the level of cyber-
security development with other regions of EU.
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1. Introduction
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The Global Risks Report 2017 of the World Economic Forum rates cyber risks right after the terrorism as the dominant
social threat of the twenty-first century. Cyber-security and cyber-space protection is becoming increasingly complex by
each day, as a direct consequence of the development of technology, globalization, the emergence of new challenges such as
asymmetric threats and other forms of new security threats. Although the use of information and communication technology
has a positive impact on the development of the functional capabilities of numerous systems, increasingly interconnected
devices and information flows are raising the vulnerability of the objects and other linked critical infrastructures, primarily
through the exposure to cyber threats and information and communication infrastructure failures. Systems and
infrastructures become very fragile and more prone to risk, which can cause dysfunction but also result in major
technological collapse (Mikac, Cesarec and Larkin, 2018: 181). According to researches, attacks on critical information
infrastructures are mostly affecting the financial, information and communications technology and energy sectors (Tofan,
et.al., 2016:4), which is directly linked to the concept of interdependence that makes infrastructure the most vulnerable,
where, for example, “the outage of a hydro or thermal power plant will not only adversely affect the energy sector but also
the information, telecommunications, economic, financial and the whole range of services, but the same is equal in the other
way” (Matika, 2009: 51).
The goods, products and services in the physical facilities is increasingly being replaced by virtual ones, which, although an
asset for community development and a precondition for global collaboration and connectivity, also causes an additional
threat of cyber attacks and shifts the focus of national security issues to cyber security. Technology binds, enables work and
progresses in development for (critical) infrastructure in all sectors, therefore it is necessary to give attention to
infrastructure protection in the cyber dimension as well. It is important to emphasize that the security system includes not
only physical protection, but also protection of data and information systems (i.e. electronic services, which are connected
to a certain critical infrastructure) and full implementation of adequate information security policies, as well as the
protection of the cyber space in which they originate and transmit different types of data. Critical information infrastructure,
therefore, is an electronic flow of information, and in this sense cyberspace itself is a critical information infrastructure,
which implies the need for a close connection between the concepts of critical infrastructure protection and cyberspace
(Perešin and Klaić, 2012: 336).
The Global Cybersecurity Index[1] 2017 presented modeling approach of five strategic pillars on cybersecurity, highlighting
legal, technical, organizational, capabilities and cooperation. It also emphasizes that cybersecurity is not only the IT
security, it also includes organizational, personal and physical security measures. But what we are witnessing today,
business processes often overlook physical security when considering cyber security as main threat. Still, what is virtual
takes place through the physical (cameras, sensors, cables) and it is very intertwined. However, although contemporary
information systems threats can be classified into characteristic groups of failures, incidents, and attacks, the specificity is
that we must clearly distinguish two important categories of information system threats from the traditional understanding:
unstructured threats (hackers, individuals) and structured threats (foreign states, terrorists and criminal organizations) (Klaić
and Perešin, 2012:2). Referring to the strategic component, especially in the context of security policies that are actually the
basis of social action, the role of critical information infrastructure and its impact to CIP policy is extremely significant,
which has become evident in the increasing interplay between these two domains. In the beginnings of establishing the
regulatory framework in the European Union in the field of critical infrastructures, following a shift in the legislative focus
from the threat of terrorism, Directive 2008/114/EC on the identification and designation of European
critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection was adopted, emphasizing two sectors:
energy and transport, but also stating that it „...should be reviewed with a view to assessing its impact and the need to
include other sectors within its scope, inter alia, the information and communication technology (‘ICT’) sector (Council of
the European Union, 2008:1). Due to the increasing importance and advancement of technology, the need to further develop
the legislative area related to cyberspace has been recognized. One of the most important documents is certainly the NIS
Directive (Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2016 concerning measures
for a high common level of security of network and information systems across the Union) adopted in 2016, but the EU has
been dealing with cyber security issues comprehensively since 2004, starting with founding of ENISA (European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security), as a specialized EU agency. In 2009, there was also a Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament the Council the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee
of the Regions on Critical Information Infrastructure Protection “Protecting Europe from large-scale cyber-attacks and
disruptions: enhancing preparedness, security and resilience“ (COM (2009)149), which focuses on prevention and
awareness and defines a plan of immediate action to strengthen the security and trust in the information society. It was
followed, by a Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council the European Economic and Social
Committee and the Committee of the regions, Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure
Cyberspace which also emphasizes the need to intensify on-going efforts to strengthen Critical Information Infrastructure
Protection. These were initial step towards creating EU Cybersecurity policy, and based on them, and the need to have a
common level of security of network and information systems in all Member States, NIS Directive was drafted and entered
into force in August 2016. The deadline for national transposition by the EU Member States was 9 May, 2018. Today, the
NIS Directive presents main legislation of the Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union and is extremely significant
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for the implementation on network and information systems and services which play a vital role in the society. The NIS
Directive was adopted to connect the key areas, actors and processes, in order to increase the level of protection and the
providing minimum common standards in this field.
Putting in the mutual context the NIS Directive and Directive 2008/114/EC, the NIS Directive arose from the need to
complement the existing normative CIP framework, because of the lack of adequate critical infrastructure protection in the
information and communication technology sectors. Although, it is important that the NIS directive puts emphasis on
information and technology sector (for the raising of the level of security in all sectors dependent on IT), an additional
challenge arises in which the critical infrastructure operators are also becoming Operators of critical infrastructures and
Operators of Essential Services which results in overlapping or duplicating their obligations (in the allocation of resources,
the additional involvement of the staff and experts to increase resilience and the level of protection). It is important for this
research to emphasize that the Directive 2008/114/EC is more focused on assets, while the NIS Directive is more focused on
services. In that part it is shown aforementioned relationship between the physical and the "virtual" and an indication of the
challenge in the interconnection of these two components. In order not to make the analysis of the challenges of changing
security environment and the impact on Southeast Europe countries too extensive, the focus of this research will be on four
countries with different specificities - two EU Member States and two non-EU countries. In the first group, the Republic of
Croatia – as the last Member State to acquire full EU membership in 2013 (although it does not yet have the same capacity
as other Member States) had to adapt to the new requirements of Directive 2008/114/EC and the NIS Directive; and
Romania which is already a long-standing member of the EU (since 2007) with presumption of success in implementing the
provisions of the mentioned Directives. Selected non-EU countries that are part of this analysis are Montenegro, which has
the status of candidate for accession since 2006 and North Macedonia since 2005, and must align with the requirements
placed on all countries wishing to become part of the community that focuses on setting a high level of security. With those
requirements, there is often a lack of awareness of the possibilities and differences that countries have in fulfilling such
conditions. Primarily because in the vast majority of SEE countries, the all-hazard approach is based specifically on the
physical domain of critical infrastructures, yet the cybersecurity domain cannot be neglected - given its high impact on the
security of networks, systems and data that are allowing critical infrastructures to deliver essential services.
2. EU states and non EU-states – understanding the differences in the approaches to CIP and CIIP
security policy
The introduction of security measures and standards, both physical and information security, through specific policies in
legal entities in different sectors of society should form the basis of a national regulatory framework for information
security. Although sectoral approaches are somewhat different, the common threats that arise in their environment and the
need to manage risk, imposes a need for a comprehensive approach in critical infrastructure protection.
We can define information infrastructure in general as “a combination of computer and communication systems that serve as
the basic infrastructure for public bodies, industry and the economy. Critical infrastructures such as the transportation and
distribution of electricity are inevitably dependent on telecommunications, public telephone networks, the Internet,
terrestrial and satellite wireless networks and associated computer resources for information, communication and control
management” (Brnetić et.al., 2013: 6). Infrastructure objects are also inter-linked in cyberspace, through systems such as
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems - SCADA Systems.
In the context of EU security policy, the NIS Directive brings definition where network and information system means: (a)
an electronic communications network; (b) any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which,
pursuant to a program, perform automatic processing of digital data or; (c) digital data stored, processed, retrieved or
transmitted by elements covered under points (a) and (b) for the purposes of their operation, use, protection and
maintenance (The European Parliament And The Council Of The European Union, 2016:13). The definition from Directive
2008/114/EC say that infrastructure is the “asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the
maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption
or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those
functions“. The fundamental link between these two definitions is the provision of services essential for the maintenance of
critical societal and economic activities. For example, energy technologies used before today's extremely advanced
technologies, are becoming rapidly more connected (and dependent) to modern, digital technologies and networks.
Digitalization makes the energy system better, through new means, such as advanced innovative energy services, yet it also
creates significant risk making energy sector more exposed to cyber security incidents.
Due to such inevitable changes, the European Commission is developing measures and mechanisms for its Member States
to meet the challenges of today. The basis of these efforts is the establishment of a comprehensive legislative framework
based on three documents: the aforementioned “Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and
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SecureCyberspace“ (EU Cybersecurity strategy (JOIN (2013)01 final); NIS Directive ( the Directive on Security of Network
and Information Systems (EU) 2016/1148) and the Joint Communication To The European Parliament And The Council
“Resilience, Deterrence and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU“ as the Cybersecurity Package (JOIN (2017)
450 final) from September 2017, which also includes the Cybersecurity Act which strengthens the EU Agency for
cybersecurity (ENISA) and establishes an EU-wide cybersecurity certification framework for digital products, services and
processes. The aforementioned Act provides for a comprehensive set of measures that build on previous actions and fosters
mutually reinforcing specific objectives: Increasing capabilities and preparedness of Member States and businesses;
Improving cooperation and coordination across Member States and EU institutions, agencies, and bodies; Increasing EU
level capabilities to complement the action of Member States, in particular in the case of cross-border cyber crises;
Increasing awareness of citizens and businesses on cybersecurity issues; Increasing the overall transparency of cybersecurity
assurance of ICT products and services to strengthen trust in the digital single market and in digital innovation; Avoiding
fragmentation of certification schemes in the EU and related security requirements and evaluation criteria across Member
States and sectors. So, the EU Member States have the tools and policies required to address cybersecurity, but it still
remains a national priority and responsibility. National cybersecurity strategies are the main documents to set strategic
principles, guidelines, and objectives to mitigate cyber security risk. Member States that already had cyber security
strategies have begun to consider revising and modifying national strategies to incorporate the provisions of the NIS
Directive into their strategic objectives. However, this is a small number of Member States, twelve of them - by the Year
2012 (when ENISA begun the process of supporting the EU Member States and EFTA countries to develop, implement, and
evaluate their National Cyber Security Strategies), which developed cyber strategies (ENISA, 2018). Such support, Member
States, nor potential Member States have not received in development of their national strategic documents regarding
critical infrastructure protection and implementation of Directive 2008/114/EC. This is a good practice that should be
transposed in that area as well. Nationally, with the aim to establish effective early warning mechanisms for threats, a
various forms of Computer Emergency Response Team - CERT organizations were founded, as the points for the exchange
and analysis of threat information. Information is exchanged not only in relation to cyber threats, but also for each defined
sector of critical infrastructure, which additionally speaks about their interconnection.
However, the vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure are not only within EU Member States borders. A particular challenge
for the Commission is encouraging candidate countries to adopt the same standards as Member States, for example in such
areas as cyber-related legislation or the protection of critical infrastructure (European Court of Auditors, 2019:44).
Additional efforts are done, but it also needs to be taken into consideration that lot of those countries has outdated systems
and technology that can be ineffective to avoid possible attacks and achieve the expected level of resilience. As well, there
is the lack of adequate measures and no coordination of critical infrastructure protection efforts (as many non-EU countries,
some of them in SEE, don't have national CIP normative framework). Therefore, vital systems, objects and networks are
exposed to various threats and in the need of comprehensive approach to develop CIP field. Having in mind the fact that you
cannot protect something you don't analyze, evaluate and optimize it is at utmost importance for those countries to identify
their critical infrastructure at national level (which is the process that was never done). The critical infrastructure field is
evolving and getting refocused on the cyber critical infrastructure which demands even higher level of protection, so non-
EU countries also need to consider the update of their national strategy on the protection of critical infrastructure, in line
with the European and other inter and supra-national recommendations.
3. Legislative Frameworks – pre and after NIS directive
Quality concept of the national regulatory framework for information security is the basis for cyberspace regulation in the
global environment (Klaić and Perešin, 2011). Accordingly, numerous countries have considered how to adapt their
legislation in order to prepare for the emerging challenges. Different approaches have been developed until the
consideration of creating horizontal legislation at EU level in order to protect the network and information systems across
the Union based on a comprehensive and uniformed approach. In this article in several parts it is shown how and why the
NIS directive was developed, its relevant provisions as well as the legislative that was existing before NIS directive - which
is today the most relevant document for all Member States, as well as those countries that are in the pre-accession stages and
want to steer their national efforts to achieve an adequate level of protection in their environment. Cyber threats, as well as
other threats to critical infrastructure, are inevitable for every country in the world, regardless of its level of development. In
order to give comparison what the Directive has changed in national legislative frameworks, firstly, the NIS Directive in
general will be presented (its importance and obligations), and then the overview of national efforts (in analyzed countries)
to achieve protection in the context of cyber (and infrastructure) security (their mechanisms and strategies).
The NIS Directive focuses on protection for Critical Information Infrastructures or national essential services, namely,
through setting baseline security measures and implementing cyber incident notification. In addition, it stipulates the
obligation to implement other technical and organizational measures for risk management and measures to prevent and
minimize the effect of the incident on the security of network and information systems. Following those requirements, the
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NIS Directive prescribes the EU Member States to adopt and implement a national strategy on the security of network and
information systems (known as national NIS strategy). This national strategy must address a list of issues, including a risk
assessment plan, a governance framework to achieve the objectives of the national strategy, the identification of measures
relating to preparedness, response and recovery and others. But the main objective of the Directive is to provide a common
level of security of network and information systems in all Member States (which was lacking before), having in mind that
possible security incidents due to interconnectivity could have significant consequences on the whole community. NIS
Directive also introduces an obligation for operators, to notify about incidents that may have a significant effect on the
continuity of providing specific service. There are two types (groups) of actors to which directive implies - Operators of
Essential Services and Digital Service Providers. The Operators of Essential Services are those who provide key services to
society or the national economy in the seven sectors: Energy (electricity, oil, gas); Transport (air, rail, water, road); Banking,
Financial Market Infrastructures, Health, Drinking Water Supply and Distribution, Digital Infrastructure (internet traffic
exchange, domain name services, and national top level domain control). On the other side, the Digital Service Providers are
legal persons that provide service in three sectors: Marketplaces, Cloud Computing Services and Online Search Engines. In
this perspective there is the fundamental difference between operators of essential service and digital service providers –
operators of essential services are affiliated with physical infrastructure, while digital service providers are more in the
„wide space“ having cross-border (or even – no border) character.
The NIS Directive is part of a broad EU digital initiative which: promotes awareness on the need to develop the digital
economy (in the relation to current process of creating an EU digital single market); enhances security awareness of
cyberspace and reflects on a number of segments of modern society – including the development of public-private
partnership and electronic services in public administration. Thereby, the NIS Directive creates appropriate framework for
the prevention and protection of society against cyber threats by establishing a common approach of all Member States, as
they individually ensure harmonized vertical sectoral approaches in terms of NIS Directive, while the new EU Personal
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides a similar horizontal approach through all segments of society as a whole
(Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2018: 2).
The Republic of Croatia
Referring to the document of the Government of the Republic of Croatia from the introductory part of this chapter (which
assesses the current situation (state -of-play) and presents the basic issues that need to be regulated by law), and which was
made shortly before the adoption of the Act on the Cyber Security of the Key Service Operators and Digital
Services Providers that implemented the NIS directive, it is evident that the importance of the European legislative
framework has been understood with the full intention of implementation.
Drawing the parallel with the Croatian Cyber Security Strategy, which was adopted in 2015, it initially meets the necessary
requirements set by the NIS Directive in relation to strategic national frameworks for the achievement of goals and
requirements in cyberspace as a virtual dimension of society. The Croatian National Cyber Security Strategy, which was
created in terms of recognizing the importance of national cybersecurity, says that “critical communications and information
infrastructures are those communications and information systems that operate or are critical to the functioning of the
critical infrastructure, regardless of which critical infrastructure sector is” (Government of Republic of Croatia, 2015). It is
on the trail of NIS directive provisions, although it addresses the risks to network and information systems that support key
services in designated sectors, where by the definition they cover a broad, general scope of all categories of possible
incidents (failures, accidents and attacks), which can have a negative effect on the security of the network and information
systems used in the providing of key services or digital services. What is significant and facilitates the implementation of
regulations at national level is the existence of a detailed and structured Action Plan for the implementation of the National
Cyber Security Strategy, but also the establishment of strategic and operational interdepartmental national bodies to manage
the implementation of the strategy and address all relevant national cyber security issues. With the proposal of the Act on the
Cyber Security of the Key Service Operators and Digital Services Providers, the strategy was expanded with additional
requirements, aligned with the requirements arising from the transposition of the NIS Directive in the Republic of Croatia as
an EU Member State.
In addition, the National Cyber Security Strategy and the Action Plan for the Implementation of the National Cyber Security
Strategy have strongly highlighted critical infrastructure and its protection concept, most than all national strategies,
assessments and plans to date. It was primarily perceived through critical communications and information infrastructures,
which are defined as “communication and information systems whose malfunctioning would significantly disrupt the
operation of one or more identified national critical infrastructures“. In the Strategy, a large amount of space is devoted to
critical communication and information infrastructure coupled with cyber crisis management (Mikac, Cesarec and Larkin,
2018: 122). Also, the Strategy emphasizes the importance of the Critical Infrastructures Act and the necessity of achieving
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its provisions. It outlines five objectives that can be equally transferred to all sectors and are part of the context of the basic
needs for implementing critical protection system procedures. These are: 1. To establish criteria for identifying critical
communication and information infrastructure; 2. Identify binding security measures applied by the owners/managers of
identified critical communications and information infrastructures; 3. Strengthen prevention and protection through risk
management; 4. Strengthen public-private partnerships and technical coordination in the processing of computer security
incidents (Government of the Republic of Croatia, 2015: 14-16). In accordance with the obligation of identification of
critical infrastructure and all procedures that were also necessary but lacking in the implementation of the Critical
Infrastructure Act, guidelines and prescribed criteria and thresholds were adopted for assessing the importance of the
negative impact of an incident for critical communication and information infrastructure, that were also ultimately
transferred to other sectors of critical infrastructure which are not designated by the Act on the Cyber Security of the Key
Service Operators and Digital Services Providers. For the first time, cross-sectoral criteria for the needs of national CI
identification have been adopted and have been successfully used. The above mentioned once again speaks of the interplay
of these two normative documents in the Republic of Croatia.
Considering period before the NIS directive, according to Klaić and Perešin (2011: 690) who are bringing a hierarchy of
information security regulations in the public sector, there are several levels: the first three levels constitute the
implementation framework (implementation policies), with laws, regulations, internal acts and other documents prescribed
by the Office of the National Security Council and information security advisers in the competent bodies, followed by
internal implementing acts in government bodies and by the regulations of The Information Systems Security Bureau as the
National CERT. The next three levels towards the top of pyramid is the legislative framework, that is, information security
policies. These include the ordinances of the Office of the National Security Council on security checks, physical security
(etc.), followed by the Law on the Security and Intelligence System of the Republic of Croatia, the Law on Security Checks,
the Law on Data Confidentiality and the Decree of the Government of the Republic of Croatia. At the top of the pyramid, as
a document setting strategic goals, was then the National Information Security Program (2005), which consists of 10
chapters defining information security, information security requirements from the aspect of international relations, the state
of information security in the Republic of Croatia, segmentation of competences in relation to data and information structure
in the Republic of Croatia, security policy, education and development of security culture), which is today replaced by the
Cyber Security Strategy of the Republic of Croatia, as an umbrella document.
The main body responsible for cyber security in the Republic of Croatia is the “National Cyber Security Council”
established in 2017 to achieve the Strategy's objectives and implement the Action Plan's measures as adequately as possible,
and represents a platform for establishing and managing horizontal cyber security initiatives, both in the public sector and
inter-sectoral. Also, the Council's purpose is to coordinate more effectively the prevention and response activities of cyber
security threats in the context of a complementary approach to the prevention and resolving security incidents, and thus to
the coordinate development of national capabilities in cyberspace. The work of the Coordination is coordinated by the
competent body - the Ministry of the Interior, and it is directed by the “Office of the National Security Council”. The
"National Cyber Security Council" is required to submit an annual report on the operational and technical coordination of
cyber security in the Republic of Croatia.
As from the aspect of general critical infrastructure protection system in the Republic of Croatia, there was some challenges
in achieving its functionality from perspective of inter-institutional cooperation and complexity of identification process, yet
they are getting overcome by adapting national framework and by positioning CIP competent body at higher level of
authority (from Administration State Body to the Ministry level). Also, the strategic direction in Republic of Croatia
through implementation of guidelines set out by European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection policy and EU
Cybersecurity policy has the prerequisites for achieving a successful critical infrastructure protection system.
Romania
Romania is facing various threats to critical infrastructure, mostly from cyberspace. This is due to an increasing
interdependence between cyber infrastructure and infrastructure such as that belonging to banking, transport, energy and
national defense sectors. The globality of cyberspace is likely to increase the risks affecting both citizens, businesses and the
government (Government of Romania, 2013: 4).
From the legislative framework perspective (where the national strategy is the umbrella document), most relevant is
the Cybersecurity Strategy adopted in 2013, which is setting out the principles for understanding, preventing and
counteracting cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities and risks. The main objectives of the Strategy are to adapt the regulatory
and institutional framework to the threat dynamics of cyberspace and to establish and implement security profiles and
minimum requirements for national cyber infrastructures, including the proper functioning of critical infrastructures. The
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Strategy also highlights increased risks to citizens, businesses and the government, as cyber infrastructures face technical
threats/failures, human threats and natural threats; puts in focus the resilience of cyber infrastructure; promote and develop
co-operation between the public and private sectors at national and international level in the field of cyber security; sets
preconditions to develop a security culture by raising awareness about vulnerabilities, risks and threats in cyberspace and
the need to protect information systems; and also mentions the need to actively participate in initiatives by international
organizations to which Romania belongs, as well as establishment of the international confidence-building measures
concerning activities in cyberspace. According to researchers, in 2013, the Romania was one of minority of countries that
defines all cyber-related notions in its national cyber security strategy, understanding it as: “normality resulting from
applying a set proactive and reactive measures that ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-
repudiation of electronic information, and the public and private resources and services in cyberspace“ (Luiijf et al., 2013:
6). In addition to national strategy, there is also a normative document developed for purpose of transposition of NIS
Directive, adopted in January 2019, Law no. 362/2018 concerning measures for a high common level of security of network
and information systems. The National Defense Strategy of Romania (2015 - 2019) also emphasize relevance of cyber
security of critical infrastructures, as the national security objectives include consolidating security and protection of critical
infrastructures - including the cyber security sector. Strategy also recognizes the need to adapt critical infrastructures in
relation to the occurrence of cyber attacks (The Presidential Administration of the Republic of Romania, 2015). It is relevant
that necessity of CIP protection is recognized in wide range of national strategies, mostly because of multisectoral approach
that needs to be applied in order to have adequate system for protection and resilience on (cyber) critical infrastructure. In
that way it can be more easily achieved.
At the organizational level, the first step was taken in 2008 by the Romanian Intelligence Service, the Cyber-Intelligence
National Authority (CYBERINT), which created the CYBERINT National Center as a platform for collaboration between
institutions within the National Defense System and the interface with similar structures in NATO (Romanian Intelligence
Service, Cyberintelligence, n.d.). The role of the Center is to prevent, analyze, identify and respond to incidents of cyber
infrastructure that provide public utility functionality, develop and disseminate public policies to prevent cybercrime
incidents and counteract incidents (Early Alert System and Real-Time Information on Cyber-Incidents) and provide advice
to public authorities responsible for the identification and protection of critical infrastructure (Barbu, 2019: 52). From the
strategic/operational level, the Romanian Intelligence Service, is the body responsible for the protection of state information
and any network utilized by government entities in the possession of state secrets. The Cyber Security Strategy of Romania
establishes two additional entities, which would act in conjunction to cover cybersecurity specific network and information
security in Romania: “The National Cyber Security System” (SNSC) as a body composed of representatives from public
institutions and tasked with the building and maintenance of a range of cybersecurity measures; and “The Operative Council
for Cyber Security” which oversees the SNSC in its duties, as well as responding in the event of critical cybersecurity
incidents. It is composed of representatives from Romanian government ministries and Romanian intelligence services
(BSA, 2015.) In comparison with Republic of Croatia it is a similar approach in establishment of competent bodies for the
implementation of national cyber security.
Regarding critical infrastructure protection system in general, Romania has transposed the spirit of Directive 2008/114/EC
by the Government Emergency Ordinance no. 98/2010 on the identification, designation and protection of critical
infrastructures, which regulates all national critical infrastructure sectors. It has organised processes, built a system of
critical infrastructure protection, established functional forms of support to public institutions and owners or critical
infrastructure operators in their tasks, and this works in practice (Lazari and Simoncini, 2014). In addition to the
aforementioned policies and measures in the field of critical infrastructure protection, the Romanian Government has
provided the basis for developing an adequate security environment with the aim of achieving the following strategic goals:
1) Ensuring unified procedures for the identification, designation and protection of critical infrastructure by leveling
national and European critical infrastructure; 2) Operationalization of the national early warning system through the
integration of all networks and existing information and organizational capacities; 3) accurate evaluation of the critical
infrastructure vulnerability levels and identification of measures needed for preventive action and risk reduction; 4)
development of cooperation at national, regional and international level in the field of critical infrastructure (Udeanu, 2015:
133). Additionally, in order to improve the transposition of the Directive 2008/114/EC and to ensure a better
correspondence, Law no. 636/2018 was adopted in November 2018 with focus on strengthen the role of the national critical
infrastructure and European critical infrastructure owner/operator/administrator and give new attributions and
responsibilities to relevant public authorities (Maravela, Popescu and Roman, 2018). It can be seen that Romania is adapting
its framework accordingly to the recognized gaps which is applied on both perspectives – of cyber and physical critical
infrastructure threats.
Montenegro
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Montenegro as the EU candidate state (from June 2012) has its strategic orientation of critical infrastructure protection in
the Montenegro National Security Strategy which was adopted in 2018, prioritizing development of efficient CIP system
and strengthening of resilience. This initial step to organize national efforts in this field, is not the first existing legislation
document that mentions CIP – it is also mentioned in various national laws, among which is the Law on cyber
security adopted in 2016 (which defines security risk protection measures in information and communication systems,
responsible legal entities in the management and use of information and communication systems and competent authorities
for the implementation of protection measures, coordination and monitoring of the application of the main security
regulations). There are also some recent strategical documents related to CIIP such as Strategy on Cyber Security (2018-
2021)with the aim to strengthen capacities for the IT critical infrastructure protection, and generally security of
infrastructures. It identifies eight IT critical infrastructure sectors and brings critical information and technology
infrastructure definition, as the „information systems whose disruption or destruction could jeopardize life, health, safety of
citizens and state functioning or from whose functioning depends public activities“ (Government of the Republic of
Montenegro, 2017:14). Additionally, it includes provisions on: Modern risks, threats and challenges; Retrospect (from the
first Cyber Security Strategy until today); National organizational structure; National cyber defense, including cyber
capabilities, critical IT infrastructure, inter-institutional cooperation, data protection, education, public-private partnership,
regional and international cooperation; and Monitoring. As mentioned, the first Montenegro Cyber Security Strategy (2013-
2017) had its main objectives of: 1. Defining institutional and organizational structure in the field of cyber security in the
country; 2. Protection of critical information structures; 3. Strengthening capacities of state law enforcement authorities; 4.
Incident response; 5. Define and strengthen the role of Ministry of Defense and Military in cyberspace; 6. Public-private
partnership; 7. Raising public awareness and protection on the Internet, which has put in focus majority of challenges and
fields of regulation that are also taken in consideration in whole EU level (Government of the Republic of Montenegro,
2013).
By available researches, the establishment of the “National council for cybersecurity/information security“ as the competent
body was planned by first Cyber Security Strategy in 2013, yet, it was not achieved. Once operational, the Council is
supposed to be the key institution related to cybersecurity issues. The Council will also be in charge of creating procedures
for the regular exchange of information between state authorities and key institutions from the private sector, i.e. internet
providers, agents for .me domain, banking sector, electric power companies and companies that host e-services in
Montenegro (Minović, et.al. 2016:20). In some terms form perspective of cyber security - the direction and coordination of
the work of the bodies constituting the intelligence and security sector is carried out by the National Security Council, and
the operational coordination and harmonization of the activities of the bodies that constitute the intelligence and security
sector is performed by the Bureau for Operational Coordination (Government of the Republic of Montenegro, 2018:23).
There is an operational importance of establishment of competent bodies so the implementation of processes can be
monitored, which can be perceived as one of the “weak points” of cyber security in Montenegro.
Considering the general preconditions of national CIP framework – adequate legislation, the most relevant document for
CIP in Montenegro was adopted in December 2019, Law on determining and protecting critical infrastructure, bringing
definition of critical infrastructure, CI sectors, criteria for identification, obligations of stakeholders and all other issues
relevant to critical infrastructure system regulation. It also regulates the area of European critical infrastructure, since the
provisions of this chapter will apply upon the accession of Montenegro to the European Union. Since the law is newly
adopted, we can conclude that the system of critical infrastructure is still under the development in Montenegro, and the
applicability of presented framework could not be analyzed – procedures for CIP yet needs to be evolved.
The Republic of North Macedonia
North Macedonia has a candidate status since 2005 and through the efforts in establishment of national security framework
its tendency to implement all EU standards in security field is very visible. The focus of protection of critical infrastructure
from national perspective is in energy sector, information technologies, water systems and air traffic (Mitrevska, Mileski
and Mikac, 2019:143) – each of them regulated by their Laws which provide the wide range of measures. In general concept
of CIP, North Macedonia doesn't have formal framework, but it has the basis in strategic and normative documents in the
field of defense and security, such as: National Cyber Security Strategy of the Republic of North Macedonia, (2018-
2022), Law on Internal Affairs, Crisis Management Law, Protection and Rescue Law and Law on Private
Security (Mitrevska, Mileski and Mikac, 2019:146).
National Cyber Security Strategy can be perceived as the initial process and willingness to establish CIP system. The
Strategy mentions critical infrastructure as prone to cyber incidents and emphasize these threats as one of the most serious
in terms of national security. It also considers critical communications and information infrastructure in terms of cyber crisis
management - the need to strengthen national capacities for cyber security prevention and protection, and implement
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activities to raise national cyber security awareness. The Strategy defines cyber-physical threats to critical infrastructure,
such as: increased number of cyber-attacks, including industrial cyber espionage, cyber vandalism and vulnerability
identification in the energy sector, transport systems and other parts of the Critical Information Infrastructure. In terms of
competent authorities to monitor implementation of cyber security and through that the protection of cyber-physical threats
to critical infrastructure, establishment of such body is was on of the priority activities of National Cyber Security
Strategy. “The National ICT Council“ was established in February 2018 to prepare and monitor the implementation of the
National ICT Strategy, and at the end of 2018, the Government of Republic of North Macedonia made a strategic decision to
establish the “National ICT and Cyber Security Council“, and extending responsibilities, members and authority of the
existing „National ICT council“. “The National ICT and Cyber Security Council“ consists of relevant ministers, thereby
ensuring compliance of strategic-level decisions across state institutions (European Commission, 2019:15).
From perspective of CI in other sectors, there are not such strategically oriented documents, yet some legislation, such as
previously mentioned the Law on Internal Affairs (regulates the obligation of the police to protect important objects that are
specific, i.e. part of critical infrastructure); and the Law on Private Security (which prescribes which legal entities are
obliged to private security – in their activities which can jeopardize people, environment, objects and facilities of particular
cultural and historical importance and in other cases when it is in the interest of the security) – can be perceived as
nationally established forms of critical infrastructure that are not defined in the means of Directive 2008/114/EC (which is
adapted and/or transmitted by Member States), but are nevertheless identified and recognized as objects of national
importance. Despite of that, it is visible that there is no comprehensive regulatory framework for the management of such
facilities. There is no legislative document that would solely (and specifically) deal with critical infrastructure protection
system. Therefore, a formal framework needs to be adopted in order to build a critical infrastructure protection system in a
whole.
4. Recommendations for future (cooperation in critical infrastructure protection and dealing with
gaps in achieving cyber-security)
Critical infrastructure protection, both physical and information-communication is a complex and challenging job. That is
one of the many reasons why the public sector (governments, legislators, etc.) cannot effectively work on raising the level of
resilience and protection without cooperation with representatives of the private sector (who are majority owners/operators
of critical infrastructure in most countries), NGOs, the scientific community and experts in specific areas of information and
national security. Cooperation of the public and private sector, must be especially emphasized, where due to the
competences that the private sector has (in critical infrastructure management) it must face challenges in achieving critical
infrastructure protection (e.g. implementation of security measures requiring the investment of additional resources). In the
foregoing, the public sector must support them, whether through deductions or other benefits that are achieved through
public-private partnerships as one of the fundamental pillars of cyber security policy.
Consequently, it is important to highlight cyber security public policies as one of the main tools for achieving cyber security.
The foundation of national information security is in the development of protection policies, strategies and action plans in
case of incidents which are compromising data, and/or functionality of infrastructures. Achieving cybersecurity is complex
task that requires multi-level involvement of mechanisms that should also be included at the governmental level in public
policy. Not only on national level, it is equally important for stronger resilience to adopt coherent public policies for EU
level on coordinated cross-sectoral action and trans-sectoral cooperation mechanisms which can ensure security in the
whole community. Also it is important to have forms of establishment of cooperation with EU (as well as non-EU
members), such as bilateral and multilateral agreements, memorandums of understanding, commitments between the
competent authority and international strategic partners in the public, private and academic sectors. The example of such
cooperation is formal agreement on stance, for example “Joint Statement, Visegrad (V4)-Austria, Croatia, Slovenia“ where
the cyber security is identified as one of the issues to take action (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary, 2017)
through the cooperation of SEE countries and other Member States.
The next set of recommendations is related to the development of joint regional cybersecurity capabilities which can foster
sharing of information about threats to cybersecurity (including early warning systems); development of tools and
techniques; exchange of experts and best practices – to have better and faster reaction in case of a cybersecurity incident
which could affect the region. On that note, joint workshops, trainings and exercises not only in SEE region but also on
European level can be very useful to test national mechanisms and see how they function before the real event of a cyber
incident. For that purpose, large scale and sophisticated attacks can be simulated as well as failure modes for recognized
vulnerabilities. As an example of such exercises, we can take exercises conducted by the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) – in 2018, “Cyber SOPEx” was held with the aim of improving cooperation between
national Computer Security Incident Response Teams and a focus on raising awareness of information sharing.
understanding the roles and responsibilities within the team and use of tools needed to successfully handle incidents; and
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“Cyber Europe 2018“ organized by ENISA in collaboration with cyber-security bodies and agencies across Europe, with
900 European cyber-security experts from 30 countries facing the scenario of intense cyber-security incident at the airport as
critical infrastructure.
The Education is the next segment of recommendation, and previously mentioned agency ENISA has activities to facilitate
education and general awareness which will promote NIS skills and support the Commission in enhancing the competence
of professionals in this area. It also provides Guidelines such as: “Cybersecurity Culture Guidelines: Behavioral Aspects of
Cybersecurity“ (2019), overviews and reports (like “Status of privacy and NIS course curricula in EU Member States“
(2015) which can be used as transfer of best practice), etc. 
As an additional opportunity for Member States but also non-EU countries are EU funds and project implementation (such
as the Collaborative research and innovation projects) which can be used for enhancing security and resilience for national
purposes, as well as the region and wider space of EU community. As part of the implementation of the NIS Directive, it is
planned to use EU funds, where the most referenced is "Connecting European Facilities" – CEF. Through the CEF
Cybersecurity calls EU seeks to support the EU Member States in putting the NIS Directive's legal provisions into practice.
Between 2016 and 2017 the European Commission has awarded €18 million funding - mainly to CSIRTs (Computer
Security Incident Response Teams provide support services to handle cybersecurity threats and incidents for national
stakeholders (in public sector, operators of essential services, critical infrastructure entities and digital service providers) to
19 EU Member States. Since 2018, following the transposition of the NIS Directive into national legislations, the possibility
of applying and using the CEF Fund to legal entities - sector operators, through the competent sector bodies, has been given,
which is additionally significant for further capacity development. Also, there is a call for proposal under the Horizon 2020
Programme (which is of particular interest to SEE countries, as the analysis in this research has shown, are mostly still
focused on strengthening the physical protection system of critical infrastructures - with a tendency to consider cyber
security), called “Prevention, detection, response and mitigation of combined physical and cyber threats to critical
infrastructure in Europe“ where SEE countries already participate in projects: SATIE - Security of Air Transport
Infrastructure of Europe (Croatia), InfraStress - Improving resilience of sensitive industrial plants & infrastructures exposed
to cyber-physical threats (Slovenia) which is especially interesting because of open testbed stress-testing system as a
concrete activity under project implementation.
As it can be seen in this chapter, there are wide range of possibilities set out to all countries that are willing to invest time
and efforts to build concrete cooperation in CIP and CIIP all in the aim to overcome the gaps between more developed and
slightly less developed countries in terms of security culture – by exchange of knowledge and best practices fostered by
listed recommendations.
5. Conclusion
National critical infrastructure protection cannot be achieved without adequate protection of cyberspace through which all
data related to the operation of critical infrastructure flows - either through their exchange or storage. That is why this
dependence on information and communication technology requires that cyber-security measures are prescribed and
regulated by national legislation – to enable systems, networks and object of critical infrastructure to be able to detect,
prevent and effectively respond to security threats in a timely manner.
An essential element is also cross-sectoral compliance, which requires well-coordinated management and security
mechanisms and separation of roles between data owners, infrastructure owners and users so that obligations can be
prescribed and systematic approach achieved. A comprehensive perspective is important, because segmented solutions
could affect the balance of the processes and the overlapping of authorities in terms of cyberspace and the perception of
physical protection, which is a possible challenge in SEE countries that generally perceive the two areas separately. In that
perspective, we can refer to our national (Croatian) example where the challenge is to effectively coordinate the processes
related to the implementation of the Critical Infrastructure Act and the Cyber Security of the Key Service Operators and
Digital Services Providers Act, since there may be overlapping of responsibilities, unnecessary waste of resources and
delays in implementation due to the lack of clarity in the implementation of security measures (what level of protection for
which area), but also the reluctance of stakeholders to whom are prescribed obligations in both laws that are equally
comprehensive and because of that one will be completed and the other not - although they are very similar. It is interesting
to see that non-EU countries have "skipped step" and regulated the cybersecurity area that mentions information and
communication critical infrastructure rather than they regulated the critical infrastructure area as prescribed by Directive
2008/114/EC. One of the perspectives on this occurrence is the fact that these countries already protect and have identified
infrastructures of national importance (without being specifically named “critical infrastructure“) - as we can see in the
analyzed countries (Montenegro and North Macedonia), but they don't have pre-existing mechanisms of protection in
cyberspace, which is a contemporary challenge that has major negative effects if a security incident occurs.
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In the part of considering critical infrastructure protection from cyber threats, it is determined that it is a complicated matter
and therefore it must be included in national preparedness planning, as well as in recovery planning of individual
infrastructures of national importance. Despite identifying potential threats and taking security measures, the level of
resilience and security may not be fully satisfactory, as the threats are increasingly modified (such as hybrid threats) and
become an additional challenge to cope, often exceeding national capacities and seeking international cooperation. The
European Union, as a supranational community analyzed in this paper (although the NATO Alliance, for example, develops
its own mechanisms), takes cyber security issues extremely seriously, placing it as one of the top priorities of modern
security. According to European Commission guidance, Member States have significantly stepped up the implementation of
activities to take action and organize organizational elements to deal with cyber threats, reinforcing existing mechanisms
and legislative frameworks or creating new ones (if they did not exist before). Countries that are not EU Member States,
followed their steps, recognizing the need to protect critical infrastructure and all the data it has, especially since cyberspace
has no boundaries and cannot be monitored comprehensively so it seeks segmented protective actions. Therefore, it is
nationally important to build cyber defense capabilities through education and training, various exercises and workshops,
the development of information sharing mechanisms and the synergy of various professional organizations at national and
international levels.
The analysis in this paper shows that there are efforts in the region to achieve a higher level of security in national systems
that are most important for the functionality of the community, i.e. critical infrastructure, however, are in line with the
capacities and capabilities of states – if there is no adequate protection against environmental impacts that affect the
physical components of the infrastructure and sufficient awareness (usually at the strategic level), it is difficult to achieve
influence on the creation of collective risk awareness in virtual space. Implementation challenges often stem from lack of
knowledge how to implement processes which are prescribed by legislation, so sharing knowledge and experience is a good
opportunity to bridge the gap in cybersecurity development  for the benefit of the entire community, region and the global
environment as a whole.
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